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The Neglect of Virtue* 
Lawrence C. Becker 
Hollins College 
Modem moral philosophy has devoted itself primarly to axiological and 
deontological matters.' There have been occasional stirrings-some 
recently-in the direction of what might be called agent-theory,2 but it is 
undeniable that ends, means, utility, values, rules, principles, duties, obliga- 
tions, responsibilities, and desert have been in the forefront of discussion. 
Virtue has been and remains generally neglected, or discussed merely as a 
derivative concept. 
I want to make a plea for virtue-much in the spirit of Austin's plea for 
excuses-as a concept which should be central to moral theorizing. This has 
been done before,3 but it is clear that philosophers in general either still need 
convincing or need a more developed apologia than has yet been provided. I 
*A shorter version of this paper was presented to the Hollins College Seminar in 
Philosophy, February 1974, and to the Western Division of the American Philosophical Associa- 
tion, April 1974. 
1. A note on terminology: I use 'axiology' to indicate the tendency to take concepts of value 
to be primary (if not primitive) in moral theory and to ultimately decide (if not redefine) 
questions of duty and virtue in terms of value questions. 'Deontology' I use to indicate the 
tendency to take concepts of duty and obligation as primary. These two approaches to moral 
theory I occasionally lump together under the rubric 'act theory' or 'act morality' because they 
have a common focus on acts. 'Agent-theory,' 'agent-morality,' 'a virtues-vices approach,' and 
sometimes just 'virtue' I use to indicate the tendency to ascribe the central place in moral theory 
to concepts of virtue, vice, and the good person. 
2. For recent writings, one may begin with John Rawls's "Outline of a Decision Procedure 
for Ethics," Philosophical Review 60(1951): 177-97. There is also, of course, G. E. M. Anscombe's 
polemic against "law-type ethics" in "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy 33 (1958): 1-19. 
The Monist did an issue on virtue in 1970, and the Philosopher's Index lists over fifty articles on 
virtue for the period 1967-73. But a look at the articles themselves reveals that most of them are 
analyses of earlier theorists' views on virtue and that only a handful are prepared to grant any 
primacy at all to a virtues-vices approach to moral theory. Those of particular value include R. 
B. Brandt, "Traits of Character: A Conceptual Analysis," American Philosophical Quarterly 7 
(1970): 23-37; W. K. Frankena, "Pritchard and the Ethics of Virtue," Monist 54 (1970): 1-17; 
Edmund Pincoffs, "Quandary Ethics," Mind 80 (1971): 552-7 1; and J. 0. Urmson, "Aristotle's 
Doctrine of the Mean," American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973): 223-30. As to books, one 
might mention Milton Mayeroff's On Caring (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). 
3. See Pincoffs and my own attempt in OnJustifying MoralJudgments (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1973). 
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111 The Neglect of Virtue 
will offer some reasons for regretting the general neglect of virtue in modern 
moral philosophy and some illustrations of the ways in which its employ- 
ment can be illuminating. Because I hope to persuade by adducing a wide 
variety of arguments, however, none of the specific arguments taken alone 
will be very fully developed. But they are each suggestive enough, I think, so 
that taken together they will be adequate support for my thesis: that the 
philosophical development of the concept of virtue, at least to the' level of 
sophistication we possess for the central concepts of value and obligation, is a 
matter of considerable importance. 
The explanation of the modern neglect of virtue is no doubt complex, 
but three factors must be largely responsible. First, it is commonplace to 
observe that there can hardly be any way of characterizing "the good person" 
without reference to some logically prior notion of good per se. And this 
point is made more emphatic when deontologists admit, as they sometimes 
explicitly do, that even their theories are parasitic on at least some "thin 
theory" of the good.4 On the other hand, the concepts of value and duty do 
not seem to be similarly parasitic on the concept of virtue, and so virtue may 
plausibly be treated as derivative. 
Second, it may be remarked that the question of a person's moral charac- 
ter is typically approached via questions of the worth of the things he or she 
does (or is disposed to do) and the motives and intentions behind those acts. 
Thus, matters of moral character seem not only dependent upon but exhaus- 
tively definable in the language of act morality. 
Third, it may be noted that as commitment to normatively neutral 
moral theorizing has grown, so too has neglect of the concept of virtue. It is 
no accident (and surely not due to an accurate estimate of their philosophic 
value) that large chunks of Aristotle's Ethics are so widely unused.5 For there, 
as in seemingly all analyses of virtue which go beyond preliminaries, norma- 
tive judgments abound-indeed, cannot be avoided. 
Philosophers are not without an occasional sense of regret for this ne- 
glect of virtue. There are, for example, many times in the application of 
principles to practice when matters of moral character are of the first 
importance-times when the issue is not how much harm has been done, or 
the value of excusing the wrongdoer, or the voluntary nature of the offending 
behavior, but rather whether the sort of character indicated by the behavior 
is "acceptable" or not-perhaps even ideal-so that the "wrongful" conduct 
must be seen simply as an unavoidable defect of it. Oedipus, on a strictly 
utilitarian analysis, merely looks like an arrogant fool who didn't know when 
to stop asking questions. But fools are not tragic heroes (pathetic, perhaps, 
but not tragic in the classical sense), and it is safe to say that Sophocles must 
have felt that Oedipus possessed the sort of human excellence that tragedies 
are made of-the excellence which contains the seeds of its own destruction. 
4. See John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
pp. 395-99. 
5. I think of books 3. 6-4, 6, 8, and 9. 
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112 Ethics 
The pursuit of such excellence may bring down whole houses, but it is not 
just like the behavior of a fool or a knave. We miss something very important 
about it when our moral theory leads us only in the direction of the conclu- 
sion that it is. 
Further, the sense that act theory sometimes fails to get to the heart of 
things is generated when one moves over from third-person talk to 
first-person expressions about moral worth. People often try to make excep- 
tions for themselves in practice. And this is part of what seems so properly 
self-corrective about moral theories which focus on universalization princi- 
ples. But it is also the case that a part of the tendency to make exceptions for 
oneself is simply the wrongheaded outgrowth of a very reasonable concern: 
that often what is fundamental to me is not whether I have done the right 
thing, but whether I am, at bottom, a good person-not what my act was, 
but whether it was an index to my character. If I am satisfied that I am 
fundamentally a good person, then it is hard for me not to think I ought to be 
excused, because I will regard my wrongful acts either as necessary evils or as 
blunders, mistakes essentially out of character. And if I am dealt with solely in 
terms of my acts-their nature and consequences-it will be hard for me not 
to feel that that is somehow beside the point.6 Self-esteem is very often the 
crux of the matter in evaluations of one's own conduct. And self-esteem is not 
built entirely on estimates of the value or dutifulness of one's performance. 
No matter how many successes some people have, they still feel they "are" 
failures; no matter how many lies some people tell, they still feel they "are" 
fundamentally honest. Moral theorizing which ignores or slights this-as act 
theory tends to do-is very often beside the point in concrete moral situa- 
tions. 
Thus, the lack of a developed theory of virtue can be an embarrassment, 
and its lack in modern moral philosophy is a cause for regret. We have reels 
of analysis on the fact-value distinction, the sources and nature of obligation, 
and the concept of moral responsibility. But comparably detailed 
accounts-which go beyond the work of ancient philosophers-on the con- 
cepts of huqian excellence, on ideals, on the good person are in notably short 
supply. There are, as I have mentioned, some powerful reasons underlying 
this fact, so it will not do much good to simply point out a few places where it 
causes discomfort. I want, therefore, to present an array of examples which, 
taken together, do two things: (a) indicate that the unfortunate consequences 
of the neglect of virtue are too widespread in moral theory to be justifiably 
ignored and (b) indicate that considerations of moral character are more 
fundamental, theoretically, than is typically supposed. Thus, the arguments 
to follow will, I hope, not only blunt the force of the reasons behind the 
6. Pincoffs's "Quandary Ethics" makes a similar point at pp. 558-59. His whole article is an 
argument for another source of the neglect of virtue: the modern assumption that the subject 
matter of ethics is fundamentally moralproblems, i.e., the analysis of and help in the resolution of 
morally problematic situations. This focus, he argues, generates a tendency to slight agent 
morality. 
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113 The Neglect of Virtue 
neglect of virtue but constitute a coherent apology for reinstating it as a 
fundamental concept in moral theorizing. 
1. ON DEFINING THE GOOD PERSON 
The first such line of argument concerns some peculiarities in the notion 
of a good person. It has already been noted that one's self-concept (whether 
of oneself as a good or a bad person) is not derived solely from a tabulation of 
one's performances (e.g., I lie more often than I tell the truth; therefore I am 
a liar) or even a tabulation of motives and intentions (e.g., On balance, I do 
things more often for ignoble motives or from malicious intent than other- 
wise; therefore I am not a good person). But it may be felt that this is merely 
a psychological fact about the way people judge themselves and that we all 
acknowledge, when we judge others, the logical force of such tabulations 
toward assessments of character. After all, how else can we possibly get an 
index of a person's character? And how could one (objectively) conclude that 
a person who typically lied-in all sorts of situations-or who typically acted 
from base motives or malicious intent was not deficient in character? 
I do not wish to claim that performance-particularly with regard to 
motive and intent-is irrelevant to assessments of character. Indeed, it is an 
important criterion. But the focus on acts, their values, motivations, and 
relations to dutifulness, misses something crucial. There are people whose 
performance is consistently good-even saintly-who seem untouched by 
ignoble purposes to the degree we have come to expect in our fellows, and 
whom we still will not call, in any unreserved sense, "good people." We will 
not so describe them when we think that their virtue is simply blind adher- 
ence to authority-training, for example-or, as for one of Steinbeck's charac- 
ters, merely due to a lack of energy. Similarly, there are people whose 
performance is consistently bad-even malevolent-but who exhibit not just 
remorse after the fact, and surely not just regret, but rather a tragically 
accurate self-perception which makes us unable to call them, in any unre- 
served sense, "bad people."7 
Why this is so is surely an important thing to investigate. The best one 
can do, at present, is to make some very vague suggestions as to what must be 
at stake here: that what must count as much as performance toward our 
judgment that someone is a "good person" is the degree to which that 
person's dispositions to act-for the good or the bad-are closed to the 
changes which can be wrought through self-perception and deliberation. We 
must feel-with the Greeks-that the equipment for "self-making" (or, less 
opaquely, the ability to perceive accurately and to be changed as a result of 
experience) is a central element of human moral excellence. This is evidently 
an important feature of our common moral convictions, and I submit that we 
have not developed anything like the expertise in explicating and justifying 
7. For a fascinating analysis of some features of this problem, see Adam Smith, The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, pt. 2, sec. 3. I am indebted to Thomas Nagel for calling this passage to my 
attention. 
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1 14 Ethics 
(or disjustifying) it that we have developed for the familiar value and obliga- 
tion questions we discuss. 
2. ON DEFINING STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE 
We are similarly ill-equipped to develop any sustained and illuminating 
account of standards of performance for moral conduct. Preoccupied with 
questions raised by attempts to decide what sorts of conduct are justifiable or 
required by duty, we have largely ignored the uneliminable question of what 
standards of performance are to be required. The existence of a duty of care 
toward others immediately raises the question of how much care is to be 
taken. We need criteria for deciding when someone has "done enough" to 
fulfill a given duty. Discussions of the problem are virtually nonexistent in 
philosophy.8 One must turn instead to the law for help. 
In tort law, the existence or nonexistence of a duty of care is a question 
to be decided by the court. The requisite standard of care is, however, 
regarded as a separate issue, and a question for the trier of fact (e.g., the jury, 
when there is one). But it is notable that the standard of care is to be arrived 
at in terms of an agent-theoretic model-usually the mythical "reasonable 
man." The trier of fact is not encouraged to consider what would be "best for 
everyone on balance," or the extent of one's duty to do a duty. The question 
is, rather, what standard of performance might be expected of a reasonable 
person who is aware of the duty and is attending to its performance. The law 
insists that the appropriate standard does not depend on consequences (e.g., 
if the victim is injured, you didn't do enough; if not, you did do enough). 
Nor does it depend on the satisfaction of some deontological principle such as 
a duty to act reasonably. Instead, the duty to act reasonably follows from the 
adoption of the ideal of reasonability. It is the ideal which determines what is 
right and just in the context of a duty of care, let the consequences fall where 
they must. 
Furthermore, this model itself is not chosen primarily on axiological or 
deontological grounds-though admittedly it is buttressed by arguments for 
its utility an~d for its compatibility with the requirements of procedural fair- 
ness. It is chosen primarily because the character-trait of reasonability is 
itself regarded as the measure of what counts as good or dutiful conduct in 
this context. Good conduct, right, just, and dutiful conduct, is defined here in 
terms of an agent-theoretic concept. Similarly for some other uses of the 
reasonability standard in the law: in determining what counts as provocation, 
when that is used as a defense against a criminal charge such as murder; and 
8. Moral philosophers have often failed to see this, no doubt because of the disfavor in 
which casuistry has been held and the philosopher's penchant for distinguishing analytically 
things which are not sharply distinguishable in practice at all. Thus, one may rid himself 
(philosophically) of the question of standards of performance by first distinguishing that ques- 
tion from the one of the existence of a duty or a principle for conduct and then consigning the 
former to casuistry and assuming that moral philosophy can proceed-unmisled-by working 
only on the latter. 
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115 The Neglect of Virtue 
in determining what counts as a mistake (of either law or fact) which can be 
used as a defense against charges such as bigamy or theft.9 
Now it is not the case that the law has simply fallen into the only 
plausible way of fixing standards for conduct. There is at least one other 
ideal-the "average person"-which occasionally replaces that of reasonabil- 
ity, for reasons which are too often obscure.10 There are significant differ- 
ences in these ideals, and because it is clear that no moral principle for action 
is complete without some specification of a standard of performance, the 
detailed analysis of standard-setting ideals should have a central place in 
moral philosophy. It does not, however, and I lay the blame on the general 
neglect of the concept of virtue. 
In fairness, two sorts of objections to this argument about standards 
should probably be considered: first, that axiological and/or deontological 
considerations lie behind the selection of standard-setting criteria after all; 
and second, even on the assumption that this is not so in practice, it ought to 
be so, and philosophers have been quite right in refusing to fall in line with 
the existing practice. 
The answer to both charges must be that the concepts of good and of 
virtue are reciprocally related: one cannot get very far beyond a few crude 
"behavioral preferences" in defining what counts as a virtue and what counts 
as a vice without appeal to consequences-to values in general.11 But neither 
can one get very far beyond what Rawls calls a "thin theory" of good-a bare 
list of those things which are preconditions for the existence of any goods at 
all-without dealing with the question of standards. A thin theory of good is 
no moral theory by itself because the "guidance" it gives is so radically 
ambiguous that one can reasonably claim it gives no significant guidance at 
all. Until disputes about what standards of performance are required of one 
are settled, one can fairly say that very little about moral issues is settled. 
Now surely the best-indeed, perhaps, the only-way to set standards 
for performance is in terms of some ideal for human conduct. Any attempt to 
fix a standard axiologically (in terms of the values to be derived from various 
levels of performance) will run the risk of itself being a rule or principle for 
conduct which requires the specification of a performance standard. Simi- 
larly for the attempt to fix standards deontologically (that is, in terms of a 
duty to perform to a certain level). The danger here again is one of infinite 
9. Indeed, the whole theory of the law of crimes (who, when, and how to punish with the 
public law responses of the criminal law) seems to me to rest on an agent-theoretic basis, i.e., on 
a distinction between socially stable and unstable character traits. But that is a very long 
argument; see my paper "Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes," Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 3 (1974): 262-94. 
10. See the recent Supreme Court decision on pornography, Miller v. California, 93 S.Ct. 
2607 (1973), in which the standards for determining the arousal of a "prurient interest in sex," 
the "patent offensiveness" of the portrayal of sex, and the presence of "serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value" is to be that of the average person applying contemporary commu- 
nity standards. 
11. See, for the development of this line of argument, chap. 9 of my book (n. 3 above). 
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1 16 Ethics 
regress. The only way to avoid such a regress is to specify-in the form of a 
duty, perhaps-precisely what acts are required to fulfill the principle or 
duty "up to standard." But then one has not set a standard at all which will 
permit the necessary flexibility in dealing with borderline or novel cases. 
Any student of the law will appreciate that it is the flexibility inherent in the 
reasonability standard which allows the law to respond rationally to un- 
foreseeable cases. And it is surely fair to say that what is true of the writing of 
laws in this regard is also true of the formulation of moral principles: that no 
formulation specific enough for action-guidance will be adequate (without 
case-by-case reformulation in terms of some standard of performance) for the 
full variety of cases to which it will be expected to apply. 
Thus the conclusion seems clear: the setting of standards for perfor- 
mance is a central problem for moral philosophy, and we have too long 
neglected the development of the best tools for setting such standards-the 
concepts which cluster around the notion of virtue. 
3. ON EXCUSES 
Equally interesting testimony to the usefulness of agent-theoretic con- 
cepts comes from a consideration of excusing conditions. Attempts to pro- 
vide a general rationale for our excuse-practices in terms of axiological theory 
and in terms of voluntarism and moral responsibility are well known. But 
what is lacking in these accounts (particularly the deontological ones) is an 
explicit appreciation of the perspicuousness provided by a virtues-vices ap- 
proach to the problem. 
Our common moral intuitions dictate that when I commit a crime in 
ignorance (such that it cannot even be said that I should, as a reasonable man, 
have known what I was doing), or when I commit a crime under an extremity 
of duress no one could reasonably be expected to endure, or when I am 
swarmed by bees and, as a reflex, slam on the brakes and cause a fatal traffic 
accident, I have done nothing to damage the judgment that I am a man of 
good character. And, indeed, there appears to be quite a general coincidence 
between acts, however damaging or otherwise wrongful, which are "conso- 
nant" with good moral character and acts for which we excuse our fellows 
from blame. What this suggests as an interesting line of investigation is a 
principle such as the following: Acts fully consonant with good moral charac- 
ter are fully excusable, and, to the degree that an act is not so consonant, to 
that degree it is not excusable. 12 
12. R. B. Brandt has considered this line of argument approvingly in the general context of 
"A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses," Philosophical Review 78 (1969): 3 37-61, esp. pp. 35 3-58. The 
principle he suggests, however, is that an act is to be excused if it does not manifest some defect of 
character (p. 354). I think this may be restrictive. We do not have to say that a person's character 
is defective to rule out an excuse, because one blameworthy act does not necessarily manifest a 
"defect" (except relative to sainthood). The more inclusive phrase "consonant with good moral 
character" is probably better. For further relevant discussion from Brandt, see his "Blamewor- 
thiness and Obligation" in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1958). 
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117 The Neglect of Virtue 
Of course, one immediately wants to know what counts as good moral 
character and what it means to say that an act is consonant with it. The 
poverty of current moral theory to be of much help here is obvious. And this 
shortcoming is to be regretted, not only because of the values of perspicuity 
which might be gained for the understanding of excuses through this ne- 
glected route, but also because an agent-theoretic account of excuses may not 
require an analysis of human freedom in anything like the metaphysical glory 
deontological accounts do. Consider, for example, Aristotle's analysis of ex- 
cusing conditions. In his description of the sorts of conduct generally held to 
be excusable, he makes reference to voluntariness, involuntarinesss, non- 
voluntariness, and the like. But his account of such matters is ultimately tied 
to questions of character, not to questions of freedom. The ultimate issue at 
stake, therefore, is not whether an act was "metaphysically free" but whether 
it was a product of good or bad character. In such a context, talk of free 
action looks like an eliminable descriptive device, or at least one which does 
not generate the thickets of metaphysical argument endemic to modern 
philosophy. 
I do not mean to suggest that agent-theory can stand on its own here. 
Clearly, questions of why certain traits are regarded as excellent, why certain 
standards of peformance are regarded as adequate, and the general justifying 
aims of punishment all will require answers involving the theories of value 
and obligation. But it seems unassailable that the whole analysis of excuses 
could be helped immensely by developing the lines suggested by agent- 
theory. 
4. ON RESCUE VERSUS PREVENTIVE ACTION13 
A further need for a development of agent-theory comes from a consid- 
eration of certain sorts of rescue cases. These are the cases in which, for one 
reason or another, one must choose between the rescue of those in imminent 
danger and the prevention of such danger in the future. Political kidnappings 
are a clear example. It is obvious that a "hard-line" approach-such as the 
British government has taken for its diplomats-is the way to eliminate or at 
least minimize the practice. The British simply refuse to deal, ignoring 
threats of torture and death against an already kidnapped diplomat, on the 
ground that any other policy encourages future kidnappings. And indeed, 
after handling, in this manner, the kidnapping of a high-ranking diplomat 
taken by Argentinian guerillas in 1971, the British have not had further 
problems of this kind. Similarly, it has been suggested from time to time that 
banking laws be changed to make the obtaining of ransom money (i.e., 
untraceable currencies in sizable quantities) impossible through legal chan- 
nels, taking the profit out of, and thus eliminating, some forms of kidnap- 
ping. 
Such proposals are conceptually convincing as to utility. It seems clear 
13. This section was suggested by Lewis H. LaRue's "A Comment on Fried, Summers, 
and the Value of Life," Cornell Law Review 57 (1972): 621. 
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1 18 Ethics 
that the possible sacrifice of the initial victims(s) by a refusal to deal, coupled 
with a vigorous police effort to capture the culprits, will eliminate future 
attempts which are at all rationally conceived, whereas dealing-even if 
capture and conviction eventually result-can only be a stimulus to future 
attempts. Yet there is great resistance to taking the hard line on kidnap cases. 
The United States cannot bring itself to do so, and it is doubtful the British 
would extend their policy for diplomats to citizens (say, in an airline hijack- 
ing). 
Similar dilemmas occur in accident cases. We (and mineowners) will 
typically spare no expense to rescue trapped miners but hedge at spending 
the same money taking preventive measures-even if it is demonstrable that 
the preventive action maximizes the number of lives saved. Battlefield exam- 
ples put the same problem in a more extreme form: diving a submarine while 
crew members are on deck; deciding whether to try to rescue an injured 
soldier in no-man's-land. Rationality, here, seems again to dictate a "hard- 
line" approach, just as in the kidnapping cases. Maximize the number of lives 
to be saved; and if that means-for economic or other reasons-that one 
cannot both rescue and prevent, then prevent. 
What discussions of such problems typically ignore is the force of 
agent-morality considerations in assessing what the rational course of action 
must be. As LaRue puts it, "The values we hold . . . can be used for our own 
self-definitions-to give a particular shape and meaning to our life. Further- 
more, they can be used to represent the type of society in which we wish to 
live. If we return to the combat . . . example, we might note that men in such 
a plight might think it important to live on a 'band of brothers' principle."'14 I 
would put the same point by noting that we have (rationally defensible) 
worries about the sort of moral character represented by people who propose 
to stand pat and let present victims die for the sake of future possibilities. 
One who can fail to respond to the call for help is not quite the same sort of 
character as one who can fail to maximize prevention. 
It would be interesting to get to the bottom of this-that is, to be able to 
say just wheat character traits are at issue here and why. There is no guaran- 
tee, of course, that we would ultimately be able to defend current practice 
over the "hard-line" approach. But it is clear that the investigation of this 
whole nest of problems needs an emphasis on the concept of virtue-even if 
what we justify as virtues are those traits which have "utility" or value. The 
neglect of virtue here-whether or not it is ultimately the primary or primi- 
tive moral concept-distorts our understanding of the problem.15 
5. ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
As another illustration of the illumination to be gained from agent- 
14. Ibid., p. 630. 
15. The same may be said of some classic problems of utilitarian theory. Why should we 
refrain from punishing the innocent if great benefit is to be gained from it? Why should we keep 
a promise when nothing is to be gained (or lost) from doing so? These and similar problems are 
helped greatly by a focus on virtues-even if one eventually were to justify the list of virtues in a 
utilitarian way. 
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1 19 The Neglect of Virtue 
theory, consider the problem of the justification of civil disobedience. Typi- 
cal analyses treat the question as one of determining the existence and extent 
of one's obligation to obey the law. They focus on notions of legitimacy and 
consent to a social contract as sources of obligation. Such an approach is the 
natural one to take. Given the generally deontological character of law, it 
does seem an obvious thing to do to start with the question of an obligation to 
obey. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are well known and 
need not be recited here. My purpose is not to challenge its fundamental 
soundness but to suggest an additional line of analysis which helps to round it 
out-and to give rational support to some commonsense reactions to civil 
disobedience. 
Consider the line of argument in the Crito where the Laws are 
personified and given arguments against the escape Crito proposes for Soc- 
rates. The Laws present themselves as having had a quasi-parental function. 
They assert the existence of an obligation on Socrates, to be sure. The source 
of the obligation is understood to be a bargain or contract which Socrates has 
at least tacitly accepted by being-and remaining-an Athenian citizen. But 
the argument has other strands as well: the Laws have been good to Socrates. 
In a real sense they made him and have kept him from many sorts of harm 
which might have befallen him but for their presence. In short, the implicit 
suggestion is that the nurture, protection, and benefits they have provided 
-their actions on his behalf, if you like-are "worth something." These 
benefits provide an occasion appropriate for gratitude on Socrates' part, and the 
suggestion is clear that disobedience would be inconsistent with this fact 
-indeed, that it would be somehow an act of ingratitude. 
Now say what you will about the "perfect right" one may have to do 
something, or the utility of certain tactics and the way they work for a greater 
balance of good over evil, the sort of person who is doing the act has a 
significant impact on how we regard the act morally. This is often ridiculed 
as a silly obsession with style; and it is used to manipulate us by way of 
"image-making" techniques. But it is a deeper issue than that. The right 
course of action, as existentialists are so fond of pointing out, is very often 
prospectively ambiguous. One simply has to act and take the consequences of 
responsibility applied by hindsight. Now in these situations, we quite 
reasonably are concerned with the moral character of the agent and the way 
in which his acts are an index to it. For ultimately we may have to settle the 
question of justice in terms of the standards set by the actions of people of 
good moral character. Insofar as insensitivity, ingratitude, and lack of hospi- 
tality are felt to be parts of moral character, their presence or absence in the 
actions of the civilly disobedient will be a matter of concern. 
Surely this line of investigation organizes nicely what we find so unset- 
tling about some sorts of disobedience (even, perhaps, some sorts of the 
carefully circumscribed civil disobedience defined by Rawls)16 and not about 
other sorts: some disobedience shows no awareness of the appropriateness of 
16. See John Rawls, "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," in Law and Philosophy, ed. 
E. A. Kent (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 343-54. 
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obey. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are well known and 
need not be recited here. My purpose is not to challenge its fundamental 
soundness but to suggest an additional line of analysis which helps to round it 
out-and to give rational support to some commonsense reactions to civil 
disobedience. 
Consider the line of argument in the Crito where the Laws are 
personified and given arguments against the escape Crito proposes for Soc-
rates. The Laws present themselves as having had a quasi-parental function. 
They assert the existence of an obligation on Socrates, to be sure. The sour.ce 
of the obligation is understood to be a bargain or contract which Socrates has 
at least tacitly accepted by being-and remaining-an Athenian citizen. But 
the argument has other strands as well: the Laws have been good to Socrates. 
In a real sense they made him and have kept him from many sorts of harm 
which might have befallen him but for their presence. In short, the implicit 
suggestion is that the nurture, protection, and benefits they have provided 
-their actions on his behalf, if you like-are "worth something." These 
benefits provide an occasion appropriate for gratitude on Socrates' part, and the 
suggestion is clear that disobedience would be inconsistent with this fact 
-indeed, that it would be somehow an act of ingratitude. 
Now say what you will about the "perfect right" one may have to do 
something, or the utility of certain tactics and the way they work for a greater 
balance of good over evil, the sort of person who is doing the act has a 
significant impact on how we regard the act morally. This is often ridiculed 
as a silly obsession with style; and it is used to manipulate us by way of 
"image-making" techniques. But it is a deeper issue than that. The right 
course of action, as existentialists are so fond of pointing out, is very often 
prospectively ambiguous. One simply has to act and take the consequences of 
responsibility applied by hindsight. Now in these situations, we quite 
reasonably are concerned with the moral character of the agent and the way 
in which his acts are an index to it. For ultimately we may have to settle the 
question of justice in terms of the standards set by the actions of people of 
good moral character. Insofar as insensitivity, ingratitude, and lack of hospi-
tality are felt to be parts of moral character, their presence or absence in the 
actions of the civilly disobedient will be a matter of concern. 
Surely this line of investigation organizes nicely what we find so unset-
tling about some sorts of disobedience (even, perhaps, some sorts of the 
carefully circumscribed civil disobedience defined by Rawls)16 and not about 
other sorts: some disobedience shows no awareness of the appropriateness of 
16. See John Rawls, "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," in Law and Philosophy, ed. 
E. A. Kent (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1970), pp. 343-54. 
120 Ethics 
any sort of gratitude at all to one's fellows for the creation and maintenance of 
those parts of the law which do promote justice. It is not that one can claim such 
gratitude as an obligation (for that is also inappropriate). It is merely that one 
senses something akin to a violation of the conventions of hospitality in such 
ingratitude. I submit that something like this sense of inappropriateness is 
what is (rationally) unsettling about acts which, in the name of however long 
a list of injustices, seem not so much blind as insensitive to what justice 
there is. And similarly, it is the apparent presence of such sensitivity which 
can render even the most disruptive acts of civil disobedience (rationally) 
reassuring. 
6. ON TORTURE, TERRORISM, AND STRATEGIC BOMBING 
There is a commonly felt reluctance, in what might be called popular 
moral sentiment, to treat with equal harshness wrongs done indirectly and 
wrongs done personally. The reluctance finds expression in many ways. On 
the one hand, the soldier who machine-guns a group of passive, unarmed 
civilians is cause for national turmoil; the episode is called a massacre. On the 
other hand, the pilot who drops bombs to obliterate a village he knows 
contains mostly civilians is not a cause for such turmoil; his act is called the 
result of an intolerable policy or an inevitable consequence of modem war- 
fare. Similarly, the person who solicits another to commit a crime is typically 
not subject to as severe a penalty as the one who actually commits the 
crime-especially if the crime involved is a felony of the first degree or a 
capital offense.17 
A further example is the typical reaction to the suffering inflicted by 
torture or terrorism as opposed to similar suffering produced by "un- 
civilized" warfare. The revulsion felt toward the interrogator who methodi- 
cally inflicts burns upon a victim: is overwhelming in a way that the revulsion 
toward the pilot dropping napalm is not-at least not typically. People speak 
of the "barbaric" methods of terrorists (indiscriminate assassinations, the 
placing of bombs in public places, skyjackings) when, of course, they know 
very well that "civilized" warfare necessarily results in just as much if not 
more indiscriminate killing. 
Moralists often respond to these common sentiments by arguing that 
they are irrational. Surely the person who hires a killer is every bit as causally 
responsible for the murder, in a sense relevant to moral culpability, as the 
one who pulls the trigger. Surely the one who solicits murder intends it to 
happen just as fully as the murderer does. What ground is there, then, for 
grading the two crimes differently? Similarly with the flyer versus the foot 
soldier. Killing civilians is killing civilians, whether from fifty or fifty 
17. See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law (Saint Paul, 
Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 415-16. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code 
5.05(1) recommends making the penalties for solicitation and commission equal in most cases but 
still recommends lighter penalties for solicitation in the case of first-degree felonies and capital 
crimes. 
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121 The Neglect of Virtue 
thousand feet. If both know what they are doing, what ground is there for 
holding one act to be more horrible than the other? And as for the supposed 
barbarity of torture and terrorism as military methods, is it not sheer sophist- 
ry which allows one to feel morally superior as long as the methods he uses 
(and which produce just as much human suffering) are sanctioned by interna- 
tional conventions? 
What I have to say about this apparent conflict between popular moral 
sentiment and reflective moral judgments is difficult to put in a way which 
does not lead to misunderstandings, but basically it is that there is a kernel of 
rationality in the reluctance to identify, morally, the one who does a wrong 
"indirectly," "impersonally," with one whose wrongdoing is very direct and 
very personal. I am not at all sure that the former is always (or ever) less 
culpable than the latter. I simply want to advance some considerations which 
suggest that the two are not plausibly regarded as on an equal footing, 
morally. 
The considerations to which I refer all relate to what might be called 
"personal distance"-that is, to the "distance" in space, time, or "awareness" 
between one person and another. Spatial distance and temporal distance need 
no explanation and figure in what follows only insofar as they affect what I 
have called distance in "awareness." A detailed analysis is not possible here, 
but for present purposes it will suffice to mention just two aspects of "aware- 
ness distancing" which are of moral importance: cognitive distance and inten- 
tional distance.'8 
By 'cognitive distance' I mean the sort of intellectual "pullback" which 
allows one to know what is going on in a "general" way without being forced 
to attend to the "details." By 'intentional distance' I mean the sort of intellec- 
tual pullback which allows one to define what is being done as, for example, 
solving a complex problem rather than solving a complex problem which will 
permit the development of a weapons system. 
Personal distance in both senses is related to moral character in impor- 
tant ways. Some people are simply unable to do certain things without the 
requisite sort and amount of personal distance. Anesthesia and the sheets 
which drape a patient's body have important functions for the surgeon's 
psyche as well as for the patient's welfare. Eichmann, who could bring himself 
to murder tens of thousands when it was merely a matter of inventing ways 
of having others (far away) do it, was apparently not so competent at close 
range. 19 There is no dearth of data to show that, for most people, an increase 
in the amount of personal distance involved correlates directly with an in- 
crease in the injuries they are capable of doing to their fellows.20 
The interesting question is how we are to regard such correlations-that 
is, with respect to what we call defects of character. Even cursory consider- 
18. Aesthetic distance and emotional distance may perhaps be understood as products of 
various mixes of these types. 
19. See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Viking Press, 1963). 
20. See, e.g.-, Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). 
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122 Ethics 
ation will reveal competing lines of argument. On the one hand, it may be 
argued that what the person who requires a great deal of personal distance 
lacks is courage and the ability to take responsibility for his or her conduct. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the tendency to distance ourselves 
is not always a defect, and the self-exploitation of this tendency for moral 
wrongdoing is less appalling than the behavior of those who need no self- 
deception to do the same things. 
How the competing arguments will be resolved is not clear. What is 
clear, and what is my point here, is that conscientious consideration of 
concepts of moral character is a necessary element in the philosophic discus- 
sion of this whole range of problems. 
One could bring forward many more examples to show how fundamen- 
tal are considerations of moral character in moral philosophy, and how many 
of the traditional difficulties of axiological and deontological theories are 
eased by an agent-theoretic approach. The concept of "double effect," the 
problem of whether to punish for attempted crimes as severely as for success- 
ful ones, and the troublesome promise-keeping cases (mentioned earlier) all 
would yield similar evidence for the thesis. But the range and fundamental 
character of the examples already presented should be sufficient-sufficient 
to show that our fascination with value and obligation (to the exclusion of 
virtue) has damaged moral philosophy, and sufficient to stimulate more in- 
terest in philosophical work in agent theory. 
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